Von Clausewitz & his two general concepts

The " overcast of war" refers as well to other uncertainties: a river whitethorn be deeper than shown on maps, and thus unfordable by men and horses; a runway may be so deteriorated that aircraft can non operate from it.

Von Clausewitz developed the ideas of friction and the murk of war based largely on the experience of the Napoleonic Wars, fought with smoothbore weapons, at a time when mobility by footing was by horse and foot, and the mobility of fleets was subject to the wind. But were these principles equally relevant to the industrial warfare of the atomic number 42 knowledge base War, and to the learning-age warfare of straight off? And if so, why?

As was suggested by the examples given at the write down of this essay, the answer to the first question is in the affirmative. The machines of the indorsement World War were fully as prone to malfunctioning, or of impuissance to meet specifications, as the simpler technology of Napoleon's day. And, as anyone who has dealt with computers knows, they can come upon down, or their software can prove to permit upset(prenominal) "bugs" that can either produce incorrect results or make up the system to abruptly freeze up. All of these difficulties can in turn contri howevere non only to friction, but to the fog of war as well: if a broken brake shoe can prevent a scout from sighting the enemy, so can a computer bug prevent a radar from detecting the enemy.

If anything, the progress of technology may appear to have increased the disruptive scop

e of both friction and the fog of war. The military forces of the Second World War were vastly more complex in a technical sense than those of the Napoleonic Wars; literally and figuratively they had far more moving parts that might relent down. Modern high-technology forces are more complex still.

The modernization of warfare has also vastly increased the amount and variety of information required by commanders--and therefore, the possibility of being hampered by overlook of information or misinformation.

The Napoleonic commander might not be certain of what roadstead existed in the territory forrader of him, but he was hardly concerned about whether the roads and bridges were strong enough to bear the weight of tanks. The Second World War commander might ponder air-reconnaissance photos, but he did not worry about whether satellite imaging of a few trucks 300 miles away might annunciate an imminent missile attack on his forces.

Likewise, the modernization of war has broadened the scope of weather conditions or other background factors that may contribute to the fog of war. The admiral of a sailing-ship fleet unavoidable to worry about calms or storms, but he was not worried that an overcast might hamper air reconnaissance, or that a pod of whales might emit sounds that confuse semiaquatic sensors designed to detect submarines.

In short, in spite of marvellous changes in the technique of war, friction and the fog of war have neither vanished nor become unmanageable. It seems, in contrast, that they have remained nearly ageless factors. Why has this been the case?

Indeed, given the dramati
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