MEMORANDUM TO: President of the United States

This is basically revisionist nonsense. However, whether or not Art's analysis is correct, the Anglo-Ameri endure leaders concluded that they had to give priority to the pound of Germany.

During the Cold War, the United States and its allies were faced with a iodin major enemy, the Soviet Union, an implac equal to(p) foe which developed massive atomic and conventional military power and other strengths, including a unified and dictatorial regime and a messianic ideology. close observers agree with Gaddis's retrospective evaluation of the American indemnity of containment of this curse: "it has, for all its contradictions, mutations, and irrationalities, been a surprisingly successful strategy" (355).

George Kennan, matchless of the architects of the containment policy, argued in 1947 that Soviet power would eventually cease to drum a major threat to American interests through the prepared application "of unalterable counter-force at every point where they [the Soviets] arrangement signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world" (quoted in Gaddis 58).

Grand strategy can take the form of a perimeter or a strong point defense. The containment policy had elements of both. In a sense, the United States because of its strong economy was able to outspend the Soviets, the burden of which contributed to the eventual demise of the Soviet empire. However, Kennan and others quickly effected th

Another facet of high-minded strategy is the necessity for choice between symmetrical and crooked strategies. Gaddis says that "asymmetry recognizes the necessity of reality of limited resources . . . one essential distinguish rationally . . . between peripheral and vital interests, endurable and intolerable threats, feasible and unfeasible responses" (353).

at America's capacity to contravene Soviet expansion and subversion was limited. American defense expending was largely foc utilize on the achievement of an optimum nuclear deterrent force which took advantage of American superiority in high technology.

High intensity confrontations generally occurred only in areas of strategic importance to the West, principally to prevent Soviet hegemony in Western Europe, its control of the great industrial base of nor'-east Asia or the vast oil reserves of the Middle east and threats to the balance of power in America's sphere of interest in the Western Hemisphere. The American decision to resist militarily the normality Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 does not conk out neatly within this analysis. President Truman and his advisors believed that invasion might be the first move in a Soviet curriculum to attack more vital areas. Other American countermoves in more peripheral areas were generally measured. When excessive force was used to protect secondary interests, such as in Vietnam, scummy results followed. Henry Kissinger said in 1968 that "no country can act wisely simultaneously in every distinguish of the globe at every moment in judgment of conviction" (Gaddis 279).

With the immediate strategic threat diminished, any president must recognize the limitations set on his actions abroad by national man opinion. As Craig/George point out, "the increased influence of public opinion . . . and domestic politics has made diplomacy a complex process" (176). Public opinion polls suggested that domestic support for a sustained commitment of major forces in the Persian Gulf was razor-thin and would probably have erod
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